CARL WATNER
Baltimore, Maryland
In
a letter to the New York Tribune on December 4, 1898, Benjamin
Tucker (1854-1939) described himself as an Anarchist. "I was the
first American--I may say the first Anglo-Saxon--to start (in 1881)
an avowedly Anarchistic newspaper printed in the English language. I
am still the editor, publisher, and proprietor of that paper.
It is everywhere regarded as the pioneer and principal organ of modern
individualist Anarchism. I either am, or have been, the publisher
of the chief Anarchistic works in the English language. I am the
author of the most widely-accepted English text-book of Anarchism.
I have enjoyed the friendship, had the benefit of the instruction, and.
have carefully studied the works, of those Americans from whom the Anarchists
have largely derived their beliefs--Josiah Warren, Stephen Pearl Andrews,
Lysander Spooner, and Colonel William B. Greene. I am the translator
into English of some of the principal works of P. J. Proudhon, who was
the first writer in any language to declare himself an Anarchist.
I am acquainted, perhaps better than any other man, with the English-speaking
Anarchists of the United States. It will be admitted then, I hope,
that I speak by the card." (359-3)*
Tucker's
Anarchist credentials were impeccable as he plainly stated. In August
1881, he started a "little fortnightly journal called Liberty.
Its purpose was to contribute to the solution of the social problems
by carrying to a logical conclusion the battle against authority . .
. "[1]. This journal appeared more or less continuously under
the guidance of Tucker, first in Boston, and then in New York, until
1908 when Tucker's bookstore and composing room were destroyed by fire.
In the words of Paul Avrich, Liberty was simply "the best
Anarchist paper in the English language".
The
403 issues of Liberty which appeared have been reprinted and
made available by the Greenwood Reprint Corporation. They are
a great source of information both to the historian and the philosopher.
Here we can analyze the history of the individualist Anarchist movement,
its reaction to contemporary events of the late 19th and early 20th
Centuries, as well as view the actual ideological content and doctrinal
changes occurring in the movement. To study Liberty is
to touch practically every social question. (132-5) ". .
. Liberty carried translations and articles from many of the most seminal
thinkers of both Europe and America."[2] While its subscription
list probably never exceeded 1000, it had a world-wide circulation and
impact, considering that it sparked individualist Anarchist movements
in Russia and Australia, among other places.
Tucker
made it clear in his first issue that his "journal will be edited
to suit its editor, not its readers. He hopes that what suits
him will suit them; but, if not, it will make no difference. No subscriber,
or body of subscribers, will be allowed to govern his course, dictate
his policy, or prescribe his methods. Liberty is published
for the very definite purpose of spreading certain ideas, and no claim
will be admitted, on any pretext of freedom of speech, to waste its
limited space in hindering the attainment of that object. We are
not afraid of discussion, and shall do what we can to make room for
short, serious, and well-considered objection to our views." (1-1)
"The purpose of Liberty, boiled down to its ultimate essence,
is the abolition of authority . . . . Liberty denies the authority
of anybody's god to bind those who do not accept it through persuasion
and natural selection. Liberty denies the authority
of anybody's State to bind those who do not lend voluntary allegiance
to it. Liberty denies the authority of anybody's 'public opinion',
'social custom', 'consensus of the competent', and every other fashionable
or scholarly despot, to step between the individual and his free option
in all things." (2-2)
As
the proprietor and editor of Liberty, Tucker was responsible
for its opinions and editorial content. While realizing that he
was never the sole owner of Anarchism, Tucker did dominate his paper,
and accordingly came to influence the Anarchist movement. However,
he well realized that anarchism existed before he did and would continue
to exist after he passed away. "I can interpret it only for
myself", he wrote. (327-3) Although gentlemanly and shy in
his personal relations, Tucker was the "plumb line of plumb liners"
in his editorial role. He tolerated no deviation from the straight
and true path of Anarchy as he understood it. His intention
as editor was to "win first the attention, and then the admiration
and assent, of the most thoughtful thousand people in the world, though
at the same time it may for the moment shock, horrify, prejudice, madden,
and alienate all others . . . . " (367-1) E. 0.Brown elaborated
this point: "I have seen much in Liberty that I agreed with,
and much that 1 disagreed with, but 1 never saw any cant, hypocrisy,
or insincerity in it, which makes it an almost unique publication."
(370-7)
Tucker's
outlook and optimism are illustrated by relating one item which he saw
fit to include in his first issue. Headlined, "The Penalty
of Treason to Liberty," it related the story told by Ariosto, in
which a fairy, by some mysterious law of her nature, was condemned to
appear at certain seasons in the form of a foul and poisonous snake.
Those who injured her in the period of her disguise were forever excluded
from the blessings which she bestowed when in her power. To those
who befriended her, in spite of her loathsome aspect, she afterwards
granted all their wishes and made them happy in every way. "Such
a spirit is liberty", concluded Tucker. "At times, she takes
the form of a hateful reptile. She 'grovels', she hisses, she
stings. But woe to those who in disgust shall venture to crush her.
And happy are those who, having dared to receive her in her degraded
and frightful shape, shall at length be rewarded by her in the time
of her beauty and glory." (1-4)
In
order to fully appreciate Tucker and Liberty, one must have an
understanding of how he and his readers understood the word Anarchism.
"Anarchism means no government, but it does not mean no laws and
no coercion. This may seem paradoxical, but the paradox vanishes
when the Anarchist definition of government is kept in view. Anarchists
oppose government, not because they disbelieve in punishment of crime
and resistance to aggression, but because they disbelieve in compulsory
protection. Protection and taxation without consent is itself
invasion; hence Anarchism favors a system of voluntary taxation and
protection." (212-2) Tucker was one of the very first individuals
in the world to advocate the idea "that defense is a service, like
any other service", and that such a service could and should be
provided by private agencies supported by voluntary patronage. (104-4)
This
advocacy was in turn based on a certain definition of government, namely
"government has been defined . . . as the subjection of the 'non-invasive'
individual to a will not his own." (156-4) The State (or
government) is in its very nature a compulsory institution to which
all are forced to belong to and which all are compelled to support.
(26-2) Liberty's supporters were the sternest enemies of invasion
of person and property. "We make war upon the State as the
chief invader of person and property, as the cause of substantially
all the crime and misery that exist, as itself the most gigantic criminal
extant." (25-2)
The
starting point of the entire Anarchistic philosophy was the absolute
sovereignty of every individual. (28-2) The only way to respect
the sovereignty of the individual would be to refrain from invasion
of every person's body and justly acquired property. Tucker realized
that criminals and invaders of person and property would remain, even
in the absence of formal governments, but "Liberty's position
[was] that, of the really serious and important acts of invasion of
individual sovereignty, at least nine-tenths are committed by organized
State governments or through privileges granted by them, and that the
governmental idea, with the State as its principal embodiment, is the
efficient cause of almost all of our social evils." (86-4)
Thus Anarchism was not only a protest against every form of human invasion
(94-5), but in particular against the aggression of organized government.
Liberty's
advocacy of Anarchism had both a positive and negative side. The negative
side was simply the call for the abolition of politics. (25-2)
Liberty proposed to abolish government and substitute in its place
voluntary arrangements. "We offer every possible method of
voluntary social union by which men and women may act together for the
furtherance of well-being." (27-2) Tucker carried this doctrine
to its fullest extent, as he was not hound by political or cultural
or social mores. Tucker and his supporters differed from all other
19th Century radicals in their conception of cooperation. These
Anarchists distinguished themselves even from the Individualists, who
believed that "cooperation for defense and protection should be
compulsory, whereas the Anarchist believed] that cooperation should
never be compulsory, and that no compulsion should ever be exercised
upon the non-invasive individual." (260-2) Although Tucker
was likely at times to call himself a socialist, he always emphasized
the voluntary aspect of socialism. His disagreement with the communists
and socialists of other schools revolved around their economics as well
as their conception of cooperation. " . . . [T]heir Communism is
another State, while my voluntary cooperation is not a State at all.
It is a very easy matter to tell who is an Anarchist and who is not.
Do you believe in any form of imposition upon the human will by force?"
(94-4)
From
the beginning of Liberty, Tucker placed emphasis on the rights of the
individual and individual sovereignty. This natural rights approach
may have been influenced by Lysander Spooner who at the commencement
of Liberty was still living and contributing articles to it. Reminiscent
of Spooner's outlook, was the statement in an 1882 issue that "there
is but one single kind of 'legal' freedom; and that is simply the 'natural'
freedom of each individual to do whatever he will with himself and his
property, for his body here, and his soul hereafter, so long as he does
not trespass upon the equal freedom of any other person." (24-2)
In still an earlier issue was enunciated the cardinal right of all individuals
to do anything and everything which they may chose voluntarily to do
so long as it is done at their own cost. (7-2)
"Th[e]
question of rights and obligations was thoroughly threshed out in Liberty
in the year 1887." (198-2) Although Tucker maintained that
he had not changed his fundamental pinions since he had begun Liberty,
it is obvious that by the late 1880s his defense of Anarchism had changed
from one asserting a natural rights justification to one asserting the
Stirnerite version of egoism. (201-4) By early 1888, Tucker was
no longer defending property as a right, but rather claimed it to be
only a social convention. (117-5) Having abandoned natural right
as the basis of Anarchism, Tucker replaced it with the concept of equal
liberty as the touchstone of his Anarchism. "It is true .
. . that Anarchism does not recognize the principle of human rights.
But it recognizes human equality as a necessity of stable society."
(126-4) " . . . [T]he only compulsion of individuals the propriety
of which Anarchism recognizes is that which compels invasive individuals
to refrain from overstepping the principle of equal liberty. Now,
equal liberty itself being a social convention (for there are no natural
rights), it is obvious that Anarchism recognizes the propriety of compelling
individuals to regard 'one' social convention. . . . Anarchism protects
equal liberty . . . , not because it is a social convention, but because
it is equal liberty, -that is, because it is Anarchism itself."
(123-5)
Tucker
expressed his changed attitude as follows: "From the start [of
Liberty] I have known that self-interest is the mainspring of conduct
and that the ego is supreme. I had not, however, carefully thought
out or even considered the bearing of this philosophy upon the question
of obligation. I took society for granted and assumed the desire of
man for society, and it was from this standpoint that I had loosely
talked of natural rights. But Stirner's book [The Ego and His
Own] caused me to ask myself: If the individual does not wish society,
is he under any obligation to act socially? And I no sooner asked
it than I answered it in the negative. At no time have I answered
it in the affirmative. . . . I have since [I8861 seen that my use
of the word right in those days was entirely improper, and this, coupled
with a steadily-clearing perception of the logic of egoism, is the only
change my ethical opinions have undergone since I started Liberty."
(201-4)
In
later years, Tucker exemplified his position by questioning the moralists
(those asserting the natural rights philosophy and opposing his egoistical
justification of Anarchism): "Why is one man bound to refrain from
injuring another? That is the question which the moralists must
answer. I know plenty of reasons why it is expedient for one man
to refrain from injuring another. Therefore I advise him to refrain.
But if my reasons do not commend themselves to his judgement; if my
view of expediency does not coincide with his,--what obligation is there
upon him to refrain? . . . I see no reason, as far as moral obligation
is concerned, why one [man] should not subordinate or destroy the other.
But if each of these men can be made to see that the other's free life
is helpful to him, then they will agree not to invade each other; in
other words, they will equalize their existences, or rights to existence
by contract. . . Before contract is the right of might. Contract
is the voluntary suspension of the right to might. The power secured
by such suspension we may call the right of contract. These two
rights--the right of might and the right of contract--are the only rights
that ever have been or ever can be. So-called moral rights have
no existence." (261-3) Tucker demanded to know what obligation,
apart from expediency, there is upon man to refrain from aggressing
against mother. (265-1) His point was that the obligation to refrain
from aggression was universal, without exception, or it was nothing.
The problem as he saw it was to justify the imposition of this obligation
upon the man who chose to forsake human society or enjoyed social unrest
and insecurity. Thus Tucker concluded that there are no rights
except mights. (194-1) "Rights begin only with convention.
They are not the liberties that exist through natural power, but the
liberties that are created by mutual guarantee." (328-4)
Fearless
logician that he was, Tucker was never afraid to endorse his reasoning,
regardless of where it led him. It was only on egoistic and utilitarian
grounds--i.e. grounds of expediency--that he believed in equal liberty.
(3204) On several occasions during the later years of Liberty
Tucker was forced to concur in certain deviations from his earlier Anarchistic
position based on non-invasion and respect for individual sovereignty.
Thus he claimed that a woman who threw her baby into the fire was acting
non-invasively, (321-1) and that in certain instances coercion of the
non-invader was justified. Reasoning from his egoistic framework,
Tucker denied that the thing fundamentally desirable was the minimum
of invasion. For him, "the ultimate end of human endeavor
[was] the minimum of pain. We aim to decrease invasion only because,
as a rule, invasion increases the total of pain (meaning, of course,
pain suffered by the ego, whether directly or through sympathy with
others). But it is precisely my contention that this rule, despite
the immense importance which I place upon it, is not absolute; that,
on the contrary, there are exceptional cases where invasion--that is,
coercion of the non-invasive lessens the aggregate pain. Therefore
coercion of the non-invasive, when justifiable at all, is to be justified
on the ground that it secures, not a minimum of invasion, but a minimum
of pain. . . . [T]o me [it is] axiomatic--that the ultimate end is the
minimum of pain." (324-4) Thus Tucker asserted that coercion
and invasion were justifiable in the case of a burning city, which can
only be saved by blowing up the houses on a strip of territory inhabited
by non-invasive persons who refuse to consent to such disposition of
their property. (324-4) (310-5) According to Tucker, necessity
and only necessity may excuse the coercion of the innocent, (308-4)
and he readily admitted that there were relations between men and the
land and of men to each other, where he would for the moment trample
ruthlessly upon all the principles by which successful society must
as a general rule be guided. (304-3)
Tucker
held "that emergencies are liable to arise in the lives of men
and of societies when all principles except that of self-preservation
must be thrown to the winds; that there are moments when the continuance
of individual life and social relations depends on the promptness with
which we violate the very rules of conduct that in ordinary and normal
times contribute most vitally to our well-being." (339-4)
In defending his position, Tucker declared that a critic's answer amounted
"in its conclusion to a statement that no evil can be as disastrous
as an act of invasion; that justice should be done though the heavens
fall, for a precedent of injustice would lead to a worse disaster than
the falling of the heavens; . . . " and that further discussion
was hopeless. (341-4)
One
final example will suffice to show that for Tucker, there were occasions
when justice was not the supreme consideration. (341-4) Another
of his critics propounded the situation of a drowning man agreeing to
forego all his worldly goods in return for being saved from drowning.
The critic demanded to know if under Anarchistic ethics such an agreement
was enforceable. Tucker's position was that such a contract was
not enforceable, even though its non-enforcement was a violation of
Anarchistic principle. Tucker's conclusion was that "there
is no obligation upon outsiders to enforce any contract, even though
it be just, and that, when individuals associate themselves for defensive
purposes, they will decide at the start what classes of just contracts
it is advisable to enforce." (341-4) Such men will decline to enforce
the just contract of a drowning man.
Turning
from Tucker's ethics and philosophy of Anarchism, which were always
and obviously a central part of Liberty, let us examine a few
other themes which were taken up in his journal. During his early
editorial years, Tucker expressed great interest in the activities of
the social revolutionaries, both abroad and in the United States.
The Russian and European Anarchist movement received both support and
publicity from Liberty [3] Tucker wrote at the time of
the Anarchist trial in Lyons, France in early 1883, "Anarchy knows
no frontiers; it is a gospel of human brotherhood that spans oceans."
(33-2) During the first three years of Liberty, Tucker
was a follower of many Anarchists of inter-national fame, such as Elisee
Reclus, Peter Kropotkin, Michael Bakunin, and others of lesser note.
As time wore on, particularly after the Haymarket affair in 1886, Tucker
came to restrict his support of these revolutionaries who practiced
"propaganda by deed." His objection was not only to
their violent methods but also to their support of authoritarianism.
Tucker
illustrated this discrimination in his eulogy on Karl Marx which appeared
in 1883, after Marx's death: "For Karl Marx, the 'egalitaire',
we feel the profoundest respect; as for Karl Marx, the 'authoritaire',
we must consider him an enemy. . . . Proudhon was years before Marx
[in discussing the struggle of the classes and the privileges and monopolies
of capital]. . . . The vital difference between Proudhon and Marx [was]
to be found in their respective remedies which they proposed.
Man would nationalize the productive and distributive forces; Proudhon
would individualize and associate them. Marx would make the laborers
political masters; Proudhon would abolish political mastership entirely.
. . . Man believed in compulsory majority rule; Proudhon believed in
the voluntary principle. In short, Marx was an 'authoritaire';
Proudhon was a champion of Liberty." (35-2)
Tucker
displayed basically the same attitude towards the Haymarket martyrs.
Nearly all the contemporary violence of the Anarchists was commented
on in Liberty. This included the assassination of President
Garfield by Guiteau, the attempted killing of Carnegie's associate,
Frick, by Alexander Berkman, as well as the deeds of the revolutionaries
abroad, especially in France and Russia. Tucker was not opposed
to the use of force, but it was foolish in his opinion to "resort
to it before necessity compels, . . . as a general thing, when force
becomes necessary, the wiser way is to use as much as possible as promptly
as possible; and, until it becomes necessary, there cannot be too little
force." (85-1) He generally considered violence to be inexpedient
and an inappropriate way of achieving his goals. He realized that the
downfall of one government, unless accompanied by a corresponding change
in the ideas among the populace, would only result in the substitution
of another government in its place. His goal was the destruction
of the governmental idea, which could only be accomplished through the
use of persuasion and reason. In the opinion of Victor Yarros,
another writer for Liberty, "The practical abolition of
the State would be a very easy matter, if the State 'idea' were once
abolished in the 'minds' of a considerable number of people." (113-8)
Regardless
of the poor publicity generated by the revolutionaries, Tucker refused
to compromise on his use of the word Anarchism or on his overall philosophy.
He wrote, that "we believe that the most manly and effectual method
of dealing with the State is to demand its immediate and unconditional
surrender as a usurper, and to flatly and openly challenge its assumed
right to forestall and crush out the voluntary associative government
and regulation of individuals by themselves in all things." (16-2)
Tucker believed that the Land League Movement in Ireland had been a
glorious and significant social force, arising from the fact that it
developed as the result of spontaneous, voluntary actions. (20-2)
Furthermore, the "No Rent Manifesto" could have been a stepping
stone towards to "No Tax Manifesto." Had the mass of
Irishmen not swallowed the idea that society is impossible without a
State, they might have been successful. Passive resistance (ignoring
the laws without causing direct harm to anyone) and resistance to taxation
were Tucker's two main methods of achieving Liberty in his own time.
Although the distance (the eventual triumph of Liberty) might be great,
the point for Tucker was that the journey had begun. (51-7)
Tucker
could not be considered a utopian, even though he envisioned a stateless,
non-monopolistic society. He clearly understood that Anarchism
would not solve all of mankind's troubles. "[T]here are some
troubles from which mankind can never escape. . . . [The Anarchists]
never have claimed that liberty will bring perfection; they simply say
that its results are vastly preferable to those that follow authority.
. . .As a choice of blessings, liberty is the greater; as a choice of
evils, liberty is the smaller. Then liberty always, say the Anarchists.
No use of force except against the invader; . . . . " (154-4)
Children
are probably always a problem in any society, and that was no less true
of Liberty's time and audience than for ours. The subject of children
under Anarchy, and of parental-child responsibility aroused no serious
controversy in Liberty until 1895. In 1890, Tucker had
chosen to reprint a short, pithy article taken from Freethought,
which apparently echoed his own sentiments at the time: that parents
have a certain lien upon their children, at least as long as the children
lean on them. (160-3) Later pronouncements emphasized that the
child, like the adult, has no right to life at all, only the immunity
from assault or invasion which all human beings are due. (235-2)
In May 1895, Tucker reprinted the letter of an English Individualist,
J. Greevz Fisher, which dealt with the question of parental responsibility
for the support of the children. The conclusion of both Fisher
and Tucker was that, "we must not interfere to prevent neglect,
but only to repress positive invasion," and that "no person,
parent or not, may be rightfully compelled to support any helpless being,
of whatever age or circumstance, unless he has made that being helpless
by some invasive act." (312-5&8)
Some
months later, Tucker reconsidered his position and came to the conclusion
that since the mother owns her children, parental invasion is not to
be prohibited. Thus, as we have seen, a mother who throws her baby into
the fire is not committing an aggression, since she is only handling
her property in a way that she sees fit. Tucker maintained that
the change which his opinion underwent consisted "simply in the
substitution of certainty for doubt as to the non-invasive character
of parental cruelty,--a substitution which involves the conclusion that
parental cruelty is not to be prohibited, since third parties have not
to consider the danger to organisms that are outside the limits of social
protection." (320-5)
The
debate about this issue continued for many numbers of Liberty
and ended ultimately by Tucker converting all of his critics but one.
J. William Lloyd broke with Tucker and Liberty over this issue
and refused to associate any longer with those calling themselves Anarchists.
Lloyd disputed Tucker's contention that children were property, while
he (Lloyd) maintained that "Each human being owns himself"
and that "no human being owns another". (325-7) According
to Tucker, the mother who uses force upon her child invades no body
at all. Tucker's editorial point of view was not clouded by any
preconceived notions or any sentimentality. He was quite willing to
follow the consequence of his reasoning so long as he could find no
flaws in his chain of logic. (322-5) As harsh or heartless as
his doctrine may seem, he cautioned that he had the best interest of
babies and children at heart as he believed that the observance of his
principles would secure to children on the whole greater happiness than
they can ever enjoy in any society neglectful of these principles. (320-5)
Another
lively topic of interest, which resulted in lengthy discussion, concerned
the Anarchistic acceptance of copyright and patents. In the early years
of Liberty, when Tucker reviewed Spooner's "A Letter to
Scientists and Inventors, on the Science of Justice, and their Right
of Perpetual Property in their Discoveries and Inventions," Tucker
had expressed his disapproval of Spooner's thesis. He could conceive
of nothing more unreasonable than granting to any one the right to monopolize
a fact of nature. (47-1) Four years later, in 1888, Tucker commented
on the position that Henry George had taken regarding patents and copy-right.
The two agreed that patents had no validity but parted company over
the legitimacy of copyright; George defending them and Tucker denying
them on the basis that discovery can give no right of ownership. (128-4)
Later when international copyright agreements became prominent political
discussion, Liberty picked up this theme again. Tucker's
opinion was that copyright, in any form and under any limitation, was
an injustice. According to Tucker, "there [was] no more justification
for the claim of the discoverer of an idea to exclusive use of it than
there would have been for a claim on the part of the man who first 'struck
oil' to ownership of the entire oil region or petroleum product. . .
. The central injustice of copyright and patent law is that it compels
the race to pay an individual through a long term of years a monopoly
price for knowledge that he has discovered today, although some other
man or men might, and in many cases very probably would, have discovered
it tomorrow." (173-4) "[F]rom the justice and social
necessity of property in concrete things we have erroneously assumed
the justice and social necessity of property in abstract things,--that
is,--of property in ideas,--with the result of nullifying to a large
and lamentable extent that fortunate element in the nature of things,
in this case not hypothetical, but real,--namely, the immeasurably fruitful
possibility of the use of abstract things by any number of individuals
in any number of places at precisely the same time, without in the slightest
degree impairing the use thereof by any single individual." (366-3)
"The 'raison d'être' of property is found in the very fact
that there is no such possibility,--in the fact that it is impossible
in the nature of things for concrete objects to be used in different
places at the same time." (366-3)
Perhaps
the most interesting part of this copyright-patent controversy was that
one of Liberty's subscribers offered a quotation from Spooner's
Law of Intellectual Property, which resulted in a great outburst
from Tucker. The correspondent, A. H. Simpson, rightfully claimed
that Spooner had linked together the argument for property in ideas
to the justification for property in material objects and land.
Tucker called Spooner's work on Intellectual Property "positively
foolish because it is fundamentally foolish,--because, that is to say,
its discussion of the acquisition of the right of property starts with
a basic proposition that must be looked upon by all consistent Anarchists
as obvious nonsense. I quote this basic proposition. 'The natural
wealth of the world belongs to those who first take possession of it.
. . . So much natural wealth, remaining unpossessed, as any one can
take possession of first, becomes absolutely his property.' In
interpretation of this, Mr. Spooner defines taking possession of a thing
as the bestowing of valuable labor upon it, such, for instance, in the
case of land, as cutting down the trees or building a fence around it.
What follows from this? Evidently that a man may go to a piece
of vacant land and fence it off; that he may then go to a second piece
and fence that off; then to a third, and fence that off; then to a fourth,
a fifth, a hundredth, a thousandth, fencing them all off; that, unable
to fence off himself as many as he wishes, he may hire other men to
do the fencing for him; and that then he may stand back and bar all
other men from using these lands, or admit them as tenants at such rental
as he may choose to extract.Now, if this be true, what becomes
of the Anarchistic doctrine of occupancy and use as the basis and limit
of land ownership?" (180-4)
Tucker
was alert enough to understand the implications of Spooner's argument,
and was quite independent enough to reject them. In fact, Tucker
claimed that he had taken issue with Spooner on this very point, after
he had read Spooner's pamphlet on the Irish and English landlord question.
"In that pamphlet [Revolution, a Reply to Lord Dunraven]
Mr. Spooner bases his opposition to Irish and English landlords on the
'sole' ground that they or their ancestors took their lands 'by the
sword' from the original holders. This is plainly stated,--so
plainly that I took issue with Mr. Spooner on this point when he had
asked me to read the manuscript before its publication. I then
asked him whether if Dunraven or his ancestors had found unoccupied
the very lands that he now holds, and had fenced them off, he would
have any objection to raise against Dunraven's title to and leasing
of these lands. He declared emphatically that he would not.
Whereupon I protested that his pamphlet, powerful as it was within its
scope, did not go to the bottom of the land question." (182-6)
As
the foregoing comments indicate, Tucker solved the 'land question' with
the doctrine of occupancy and use as the sole basis and limit of land
ownership. This doctrine was based upon the teachings of Josiah
Warren who advocated that natural wealth is not property at all and
that neither the State nor the individual can set a price upon it without
violating the first principle of commercial justice, that cost is the
equitable limit of price. (28-2) The Anarchists of this school
were definitely against the payment of rent by tenants (the actual occupiers
of a given piece of land) to a landlord. Their case was intertwined
with their advocacy of removing the restrictions from the business of
banking as well as depriving property in land of legal sanction and
title. (39-1) The doctrine of occupancy and use evolved from the
mid-19th Century theories of land reformer George Henry Evans, who enunciated
the principle that each man shall possess the ground he can use and
no more. (126-5)
The
basis of all the controversy among the Anarchists (and with other social
reformers of their time, especially Henry George and the Single-Taxers)
was essentially about determining the justness of land holding.
Auberon Herbert, the English voluntary taxationist and a contributor
to Liberty, insisted on treating the land question as if it were
simply a problem of buying and selling, and loaning and borrowing.
Tucker cited another English critic of Herbert, who noted, "When
we come to the question of the ethical basis of property, Mr. Herbert
refers us to 'the open market'. But this is an evasion.
The question is not whether we should be able to sell or acquire 'in
the open market' anything which we rightfully possess, but how we come
into rightful possession." (172-7)
Mr.
Tucker's most relentless critic (although eventually a convert to the
cause) of the occupancy and use doctrine was Stephen Byington.
The Anarchistic doctrine of occupancy and use was always expounded in
a general sort of way and never really dealt with serious details.
The Anarchist doctrine consisted basically of the following provisions
as outlined by Tucker: "Occupancy and use is the only title to
land in which we will protect you; if you attempt to use land which
another is occupying and using, we will protect him against you; if
another attempts to use land to which you lay claim, but which you are
not occupying and using, we will not interfere with him; but of such
land as you occupy and use you are the sole master, and we will not
ourselves take from you, or allow anyone else to take from you, whatever
you may get out of such land." (252-3) Tucker further informed
Byington that "A man cannot be allowed, merely by putting labor,
to the limit of his capacity and beyond the limit of his personal use,
into material of which there is a limited supply and the use of which
is essential to the existence of other men, to withhold that material
from other men's use; and any contract based upon or involving such
withholding is lacking in sanctity or legitimacy as a contract to deliver
stolen goods." (32'1-4) Byington pushed Tucker to answer
what would happen to people desirous of renting a room or a building
for only a short time, or what would happen to the ownership of buildings
when occupiers and users of the land upon which they were built changed,
or how vacationers would secure their premises while away? Tucker considered
these questions matters of administrative detail, unworthy of discussion
unless the attempt be to show that the theory of occupancy and use was
unworkable. (331-4)
According
to Tucker, the last user and occupier of a given piece of land would
have to remove all of his personal property (unless specifically sold
to the next occupier-user), otherwise he would lose control of it. "The
man who persists in storing his property on another's premises is an
invader, and it 'is' his 'crime' that alienates control of his property.
He is 'fined one house,' not 'for building a house and then letting
another man live in it,' but for invading the premises of another."
(331-4)
For
Tucker and his band of 19th Century Anarchists there were four fundamental
monopolies, i.e. four modes by which governments granted legal privileges
to the few at the great expense to the many. These four monopolies
were the land monopoly, the tariff monopoly, the banking monopoly, and
the patent and copyright monopoly. All but the tariff question
received prominent coverage in Liberty. The tariff question was
very clear cut and there was little controversy among Anarchists on
this point. They all believed in free trade without restriction.
The question of the banking monopoly was not so simple, as the Anarchists
differed among themselves, as well as with their opponents, on economic
theory. Discussions were carried on about economic problems relating
to money and banking, namely, the nature of capital and interest, the
basis of the standard of value for money, and the significance of free
banking theory to Anarchist doctrine.
In
order to understand the Anarchist objection to government money, it
is first necessary to distinguish between their political objections
and their economic objections. Politically, they were against
government compulsion and therefore were against governmental prohibition
of any voluntary currency or arrangements that the people might make
for and among themselves. The Anarchists rejected the Greenback
movement primarily for this reason: "It is greenbackism that
Liberty objects to, for its first and fundamental principle . .
. is that it shall be a criminal offense for any individual or association
to issue currency for circulation, and that there shall be no money
except that issued by the government. . . . Greenbackism is money monopoly
in its most extreme form. Free money, on the other hand, means
free trade carried into finance, unlimited competition in the business
of 'making money', and as a result, the utter rout of inferior and usurious
currencies by the virtues of the cheapest and the best." (37-1)
Again, politically speaking, the Anarchists objected to laws relating
to interest or usury legislation. They continuously opposed "the
claim that one has a moral right to take usury, but advocate no method
of abolishing it save the removal of all restrictions preventing the
free action of natural principles. To attempt to suppress usury
by statute is outrageous because tyrannical, and foolish because ineffectual."
(6-1)
Most
of Liberty's adherents believed that the governmental limitations
placed on the amount of currency issued and on the choice of media of
exchange (generally being restricted to gold and silver) were the cause
of financial depressions as well as the cause that interest was charged
on loans of money. In a criticism of William Graham Sumner, a
Liberty correspondent put forth the proposition that "Interest
has no existence in Nature, but is solely due to monopoly, whose parent
the State alone is." (78-4) There were many other discussions
in Liberty relating to the value of money and the nature of capital
and interest, which generally reduced themselves to the claim that any
increase in the supply of money (which would be the result of a regime
of free banking) would confer a social benefit and would lead to the
disappearance of interest.[4]
Although
their economic arguments have not stood the test of time, the political
objections to government money were and still are quite valid.
Free banking and free money meant the utter absence of restriction upon
the issue of all money not fraudulent (80-4) and this was considered
to be a cardinal doctrine of Anarchism. (314-5) Tucker was a supporter
of the concept of mutual banking, as outlined both by P. J. Proudhon,
and his own friend and mentor, Colonel William B. Greene (author of
Mutual Banking), by which the monetization of all marketable wealth
was made possible. Tucker's position was that free banking would
lead to mutual banking, and that this could only come about through
absolute free competition in banking. (314-5 and 69-4) It was
Tucker's belief that mutual banking would be the single greatest step
that could possibly be taken in the direction of emancipating labor
from poverty. No single liberty was as necessary as the liberty of banking.
(314-5)
Liberty's
concern with social unrest and labor was evinced by its discussion of
boycotts, unions and the strike. As early as 1886,Tucker elaborated
that "any individual may place any condition he chooses, provided
the condition be not in itself invasive, upon the doing or not doing
of anything which he has a right to do or not do; but no individual
can rightfully be a party to any bargain which makes a necessarily invasive
condition incumbent upon any of the contracting parties. From
which it follows that an individual may rightfully 'extort' money from
another by 'threatening' him with certain consequences, provided those
consequences are of such a nature that he can cause them without infringing
upon anybody's rights." (85-1) On December 3, 1887, Liberty
declared; "A man has a right to threaten what he has a right to
execute. The boundary-line of justifiable boycott is fixed by
the nature of the threat used." (113-4) Tucker boasted that
"prior to these declarations, so far as [he knew], the true foundation
and limitation of the right to boycott had never been laid down."
(369-2) In this connection it is also interesting to note that
Liberty not only questioned the law against blackmail, but also
the laws against libel and slander. Victor Yarros, a close Tucker
associate during many of the Liberty years, was "inclined
to take the position that all speech ought to be free, and that there
can be no invasive quality in mere speech." (312-2) As a
person does not own his own reputation, it merely being a measure of
the view held of him by others, then, regardless of the truth or falsity
of an alleged libel or slander, no speech, in and of itself, can be
invasive. Therefore all libel and slander laws ought to be abolished.
(312-2)
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