Niall Ferguson: Obama’s Gotta Go
Why does Paul Ryan scare the president so much? Because Obama has broken his promises, and it’s clear that the GOP ticket’s path to prosperity is our only hope.
I
 was a good loser four years ago. “In the grand scheme of history,” I 
wrote the day after Barack Obama’s election as president, “four decades 
is not an especially long time. Yet in that brief period America has 
gone from the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. to the apotheosis 
of Barack Obama. You would not be human if you failed to acknowledge 
this as a cause for great rejoicing.”
 
Despite
 having been—full disclosure—an adviser to John McCain, I acknowledged 
his opponent’s remarkable qualities: his soaring oratory, his cool, 
hard-to-ruffle temperament, and his near faultless campaign 
organization.
Yet
 the question confronting the country nearly four years later is not who
 was the better candidate four years ago. It is whether the winner has 
delivered on his promises. And the sad truth is that he has not.
In
 his inaugural address, Obama promised “not only to create new jobs, but
 to lay a new foundation for growth.” He promised to “build the roads 
and bridges, the electric grids, and digital lines that feed our 
commerce and bind us together.” He promised to “restore science to its 
rightful place and wield technology’s wonders to raise health care’s 
quality and lower its cost.” And he promised to “transform our schools and colleges and universities 
 to meet the demands of a new age.” Unfortunately the president’s 
scorecard on every single one of those bold pledges is pitiful.
In
 an unguarded moment earlier this year, the president commented that the
 private sector of the economy was “doing fine.” Certainly, the stock 
market is well up (by 74 percent) relative to the close on Inauguration 
Day 2009. But the total number of private-sector jobs is still 4.3 
million below the January 2008 peak. Meanwhile, since 2008, a staggering
 3.6 million Americans have been added to Social Security’s disability insurance  program. This is one of many ways unemployment is being concealed.
In
 his fiscal year 2010 budget—the first he presented—the president 
envisaged growth of 3.2 percent in 2010, 4.0 percent in 2011, 4.6 
percent in 2012. The actual numbers were 2.4 percent in 2010 and 1.8 
percent in 2011; few forecasters now expect it to be much above 2.3 
percent this year.
Unemployment
 was supposed to be 6 percent by now. It has averaged 8.2 percent this 
year so far. Meanwhile real median annual household income has dropped 
more than 5 percent since June 2009. Nearly 110 million individuals 
received a welfare benefit in 2011, mostly Medicaid or food stamps.
Welcome
 to Obama’s America: nearly half the population is not represented on a 
taxable return—almost exactly the same proportion that lives in a 
household where at least one member receives some type of government 
benefit. We are becoming the 50–50 nation—half of us paying the taxes, 
the other half receiving the benefits.
 
 
 
 Niall Ferguson discusses Obama's broken promises on ‘Face the Nation.’
 
 
And
 all this despite a far bigger hike in the federal debt than we were 
promised. According to the 2010 budget, the debt in public hands was 
supposed to fall in relation to GDP from 67 percent in 2010 to less than
 66 percent this year. If only. By the end of this year, according to 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), it will reach 70 percent of GDP. 
These figures significantly understate the debt problem, however. The 
ratio that matters is debt to revenue. That number has leapt upward from
 165 percent in 2008 to 262 percent this year, according to figures from
 the International Monetary Fund. Among developed economies, only 
Ireland and Spain have seen a bigger deterioration.
Not
 only did the initial fiscal stimulus fade after the sugar rush of 2009,
 but the president has done absolutely nothing to close the long-term 
gap between spending and revenue.
His
 much-vaunted health-care reform will not prevent spending on health 
programs growing from more than 5 percent of GDP today to almost 10 
percent in 2037. Add the projected increase in the costs of Social 
Security and you are looking at a total bill of 16 percent of GDP 25 
years from now. That is only slightly less than the average cost of all 
federal programs and activities, apart from net interest payments, over 
the past 40 years. Under this president’s policies, the debt is on 
course to approach 200 percent of GDP in 2037—a mountain of debt that is
 bound to reduce growth even further.
 
 
 
 Newsweek’s executive editor, Justine Rosenthal, tells the story behind Ferguson’s cover story.
 
 
And
 even that figure understates the real debt burden. The most recent 
estimate for the difference between the net present value of federal 
government liabilities and the net present value of future federal 
revenues—what economist Larry Kotlikoff calls the true “fiscal gap”—is 
$222 trillion.
The
 president’s supporters will, of course, say that the poor performance 
of the economy can’t be blamed on him. They would rather finger his 
predecessor, or the economists he picked to advise him, or Wall Street, 
or Europe—anyone but the man in the White House.
There’s
 some truth in this. It was pretty hard to foresee what was going to 
happen to the economy in the years after 2008. Yet surely we can 
legitimately blame the president for the political mistakes of the past 
four years. After all, it’s the president’s job to run the executive 
branch effectively—to lead the nation. And here is where his failure has
 been greatest.
 
On
 paper it looked like an economics dream team: Larry Summers, Christina 
Romer, and Austan Goolsbee, not to mention Peter Orszag, Tim Geithner, 
and Paul Volcker. The inside story, however, is that the president was 
wholly unable to manage the mighty brains—and egos—he had assembled to 
advise him.
According to Ron Suskind’s book Confidence Men,
 Summers told Orszag over dinner in May 2009: “You know, Peter, we’re 
really home alone ... I mean it. We’re home alone. There’s no adult in 
charge. Clinton would never have made these mistakes [of indecisiveness 
on key economic issues].” On issue after issue, according to Suskind, 
Summers overruled the president. “You can’t just march in and make that 
argument and then have him make a decision,” Summers told Orszag, 
“because he doesn’t know what he’s deciding.” (I have heard similar 
things said off the record by key participants in the president’s 
interminable “seminar” on Afghanistan policy.)
This
 problem extended beyond the White House. After the imperial presidency 
of the Bush era, there was something more like parliamentary government 
in the first two years of Obama’s administration. The president 
proposed; Congress disposed. It was Nancy Pelosi and her cohorts who 
wrote the stimulus bill and made sure it was stuffed full of political 
pork. And it was the Democrats in Congress—led by Christopher Dodd and 
Barney Frank—who devised the 2,319-page Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank, for short), a near-perfect example of 
excessive complexity in regulation. The act requires that regulators 
create 243 rules, conduct 67 studies, and issue 22 periodic reports. It 
eliminates one regulator and creates two new ones.
It
 is five years since the financial crisis began, but the central 
problems—excessive financial concentration and excessive financial 
leverage—have not been addressed.
Today
 a mere 10 too-big-to-fail financial institutions are responsible for 
three quarters of total financial assets under management in the United 
States. Yet the country’s largest banks are at least $50 billion short 
of meeting new capital requirements under the new “Basel III” accords 
governing bank capital adequacy.
 
And
 then there was health care. No one seriously doubts that the U.S. 
system needed to be reformed. But the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) of 2010 did nothing to address the core defects of the 
system: the long-run explosion of Medicare costs as the baby boomers 
retire, the “fee for service” model that drives health-care inflation, 
the link from employment to insurance that explains why so many 
Americans lack coverage, and the excessive costs of the liability 
insurance that our doctors need to protect them from our lawyers.
Ironically,
 the core Obamacare concept of the “individual mandate” (requiring all 
Americans to buy insurance or face a fine) was something the president 
himself had opposed when vying with Hillary Clinton for the Democratic 
nomination. A much more accurate term would be “Pelosicare,” since it 
was she who really forced the bill through Congress.
Pelosicare
 was not only a political disaster. Polls consistently showed that only a
 minority of the public liked the ACA, and it was the main reason why 
Republicans regained control of the House in 2010. It was also another 
fiscal snafu. The president pledged that health-care reform would not 
add a cent to the deficit. But the CBO and the Joint Committee on 
Taxation now estimate that the insurance-coverage provisions of the ACA 
will have a net cost of close to $1.2 trillion over the 2012–22 period.
The
 president just kept ducking the fiscal issue. Having set up a 
bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, 
headed by retired Wyoming Republican senator Alan Simpson and former 
Clinton chief of staff Erskine Bowles, Obama effectively sidelined its 
recommendations of approximately $3 trillion in cuts and $1 trillion in 
added revenues over the coming decade. As a result there was no “grand 
bargain” with the House Republicans—which means that, barring some 
miracle, the country will hit a fiscal cliff on Jan. 1 as the Bush tax 
cuts expire and the first of $1.2 trillion of automatic, 
across-the-board spending cuts are imposed. The CBO estimates the net 
effect could be a 4 percent reduction in output.
The
 failures of leadership on economic and fiscal policy over the past four
 years have had geopolitical consequences. The World Bank expects the 
U.S. to grow by just 2 percent in 2012. China will grow four times 
faster than that; India three times faster. By 2017, the International 
Monetary Fund predicts, the GDP of China will overtake that of the 
United States.
 
Meanwhile,
 the fiscal train wreck has already initiated a process of steep cuts in
 the defense budget, at a time when it is very far from clear that the 
world has become a safer place—least of all in the Middle East.
For
 me the president’s greatest failure has been not to think through the 
implications of these challenges to American power. Far from developing a
 coherent strategy, he believed—perhaps encouraged by the premature 
award of the Nobel Peace Prize—that all he needed to do was to make 
touchy-feely speeches around the world explaining to foreigners that he 
was not George W. Bush.
In
 Tokyo in November 2009, the president gave his boilerplate 
hug-a-foreigner speech: “In an interconnected world, power does not need
 to be a zero-sum game, and nations need not fear the success of another
 ... The United States does not seek to contain China ... On the 
contrary, the rise of a strong, prosperous China can be a source of 
strength for the community of nations.” Yet by fall 2011, this approach 
had been jettisoned in favor of a “pivot” back to the Pacific, including
 risible deployments of troops to Australia and Singapore. From the 
vantage point of Beijing, neither approach had credibility.
His
 Cairo speech of June 4, 2009, was an especially clumsy bid to 
ingratiate himself on what proved to be the eve of a regional 
revolution. “I’m also proud to carry with me,” he told Egyptians, “a 
greeting of peace from Muslim communities in my country: Assalamu alaikum
 ... I’ve come here ... to seek a new beginning between the United 
States and Muslims around the world, one based ... upon the truth that 
America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition.”
 
Believing
 it was his role to repudiate neoconservatism, Obama completely missed 
the revolutionary wave of Middle Eastern democracy—precisely the wave 
the neocons had hoped to trigger with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in
 Iraq. When revolution broke out—first in Iran, then in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, and Syria—the president faced stark alternatives. He could try to
 catch the wave by lending his support to the youthful revolutionaries 
and trying to ride it in a direction advantageous to American interests.
 Or he could do nothing and let the forces of reaction prevail.
In
 the case of Iran he did nothing, and the thugs of the Islamic Republic 
ruthlessly crushed the demonstrations. Ditto Syria. In Libya he was 
cajoled into intervening. In Egypt he tried to have it both ways, 
exhorting Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to leave, then drawing back 
and recommending an “orderly transition.” The result was a 
foreign-policy debacle. Not only were Egypt’s elites appalled by what 
seemed to them a betrayal, but the victors—the Muslim Brotherhood—had 
nothing to be grateful for. America’s closest Middle Eastern 
allies—Israel and the Saudis—looked on in amazement.
“This is what happens when you get caught by surprise,” an anonymous American official told The New York Times
 in February 2011. “We’ve had endless strategy sessions for the past two
 years on Mideast peace, on containing Iran. And how many of them 
factored in the possibility that Egypt moves from stability to turmoil? 
None.”
Remarkably
 the president polls relatively strongly on national security. Yet the 
public mistakes his administration’s astonishingly uninhibited use of 
political assassination for a coherent strategy. According to the Bureau
 of Investigative Journalism in London, the civilian proportion of drone
 casualties was 16 percent last year. Ask yourself how the liberal media
 would have behaved if George W. Bush had used drones this way. Yet 
somehow it is only ever Republican secretaries of state who are accused 
of committing “war crimes.”
The
 real crime is that the assassination program destroys potentially 
crucial intelligence (as well as antagonizing locals) every time a drone
 strikes. It symbolizes the administration’s decision to abandon 
counterinsurgency in favor of a narrow counterterrorism. What that means
 in practice is the abandonment not only of Iraq but soon of Afghanistan
 too. Understandably, the men and women who have served there wonder 
what exactly their sacrifice was for, if any notion that we are nation 
building has been quietly dumped. Only when both countries sink back 
into civil war will we realize the real price of Obama’s foreign policy.
 
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